Alvor Agreement

The main objective of the Portuguese government in the negotiations was to avoid the mass exodus of white Angolans. Paradoxically, the agreement allowed only the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA to nominate candidates in the first legislative elections, and bakongo deprived of their rights in the east of the country, the Cabindese (the inhabitants of Cabinda, an enclave in the north of the rest of Angola, many of whom wanted independence separate from Angola) and the whites. The Portuguese argued that white Angolans should join nationalist movements and that movements should moderate their platforms to broaden their political foundations. [3] The agreement provided no mechanism for verifying the number of combatants of each force, an error criticized by the author Donald Rothschild. The Portuguese troops, which at the time were still deployed in the country, did not get involved. Fighting by political groups resumed and reached new heights as foreign arms deliveries increased. In February, the Cuban government warned the Eastern Bloc that the Alvor agreement would not succeed. In the spring, the African National Congress and SWAPO reiterated Cuba`s warning. Westad, Odd Arne. “The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times,” 2005. Page 227.] Leaders of the Organization for African Unity held a peace conference in Nakuru, Kenya, in June, hosted by Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta. Angolan leaders issued the Nakuru Statement on June 21, McDannald, Alexander Hopkins. “The Americana Annual: An Encyclopedia of Current Events, 1877-1976,” 1976.

Page 86.] approval of compliance with the provisions of the Alvor Agreement, while acknowledging a lack of mutual trust, led to violence. Many analysts have criticized Portugal`s interim government for the violence that followed the Alvor agreement because it did not care about Angola`s internal security and preference for the MPLA. High Commissioner Coutinho, one of the seven leaders of the national salvation junta, openly donated Portuguese military equipment to MPLA troops. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela R. Aall. “Grasping The Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict,” 2005. Page 213.] By the end of January, the United States had received financial assistance from the FNLA. At the end of May, the MPLA received weapons from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the military balance began to shift in its favor.

[Quotes from “Information from the Politburo member of the Angola People`s Liberation Movement (MPLA), Iko Carreira, on the current situation in Angola, p.4-5, including in “Model for the Politburo,” Berlin, 3 Sept.1975, SED, DY30JIV2/2A1911] [O Comercio, February 13, 1975,j. 10] [Heimer: Decolonization conflict, 193-194] [Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002, 252-253] Once again, the United States strengthened its support for the FNLA and provided direct support to UNITA for the first time. [lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID-ao0044)] In July, the MPLA took over in Luanda and expelled the FNLA from the city. UNITA was not involved in the fight for Luanda, but consolidated its assets among the Ovimbundu. FNLA and UNITA formed an alliance and withdrew from the transitional government, which inevitably disintegrated on 14 August. Officially, Portugal took executive power, but it was the MPLA that filled the void and extended its control over the government. [lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field (DOCID-ao0045)] The war spread throughout Angola. On 18 July, President Ford authorized covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA, which regrouped and launched the covert operation “IAFEATURE”. Britain, France, China and South Africa also had secret aid programmes. [Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press 2002, P.

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